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Abstract
Following the collapse of Bear Stearns Companies in early 2008, it became clear that there
was no immediate prospect that the asset-backed securities (ABS) markets would start to
operate as they had previously. Financial institutions relied heavily on ABS as collateral in
the interbank lending market for funding and liquidity. The Bank of England (BoE)
introduced the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) in April 2008 as a temporary measure to
address the immediate liquidity problems facing the UK banking system at the time. Under
the SLS, banks could exchange high-quality assets that had temporarily become illiquid for
liquid UK Treasury bills. In turn, banks could use these Treasury bills in private markets to
obtain cash. During the nine months that the SLS was open, 32 banks and building societies,
representing over 80% of the sterling balance sheets of eligible financial institutions,
exchanged a total of £185 billion of eligible collateral for Treasury bills.
Keywords: Bank of England, market liquidity, Her Majesty’s Treasury, mortgage-backed
securities, asset-backed securities, Treasury bills, gilt

_____________________________________________________________________
This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs.
1
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2 Kaleb Nygaard – Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
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UK Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS)
At a Glance
Following the collapse of Bear Stearns
Companies in early 2008, it became clear that
there was no immediate prospect that the
asset-backed securities (ABS) markets would
start to operate as they had previously.
Financial institutions relied heavily on ABS as
collateral in the interbank lending market for
funding and liquidity.
The Bank of England (BoE) introduced the
Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) in April 2008 as
a temporary measure to address the immediate
liquidity problems facing the UK banking
system at the time. Under the SLS, banks could
exchange high-quality assets that had
temporarily become illiquid for liquid UK
Treasury bills. In turn, banks could use these
Treasury bills in private markets to obtain cash.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To increase liquidity in the banking
system and confidence in financial markets.
Announcement Date
Operational Date
Drawdown Window
Closed
Program End

April 21, 2008
April 21, 2008
January 30, 2009

Aggregate Treasury Bills
Lent
Administrator

£185 billion

Eligible Assets

Covered bonds, ABS,
sovereign debt, US
GSE debt

January 2012

Bank of England and
HM Treasury

During the nine months that the SLS were open,
32 banks and building societies, representing over 80% of the sterling balance sheets of
eligible financial institutions, exchanged a total of £185 billion of eligible collateral for
Treasury bills.
Summary Evaluation
Academic reviews of the SLS’s effectiveness have not been conducted. However, the Bank of
England was encouraged by the results such that it “drew on a number of the features of the
SLS in designing a new, permanent bilateral liquidity insurance facility, the Discount Window
Facility (DWF), which was launched in October 2008” (Cross, Fisher, and Weeken 2010).
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UK Special Liquidity Scheme: United Kingdom Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

$3,102.8 billion in 2007
$2,948.0 billion in 2008
Source: Bloomberg

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

$50,567 in 2007
$47,287 in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4 2007:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Sovereign credit
rating (5-year senior
debt)

As of Q4 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Source: Bloomberg

Size of banking
system

$4,895.3 billion in total assets in 2007
$5,299.6 billion in total assets in 2008
Source: Bloomberg

Size of banking
system as a
percentage of GDP
Size of banking
system as a
percentage of
financial system

157.8% in 2007
179.8% in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
Data not available for 2007/2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
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76.8% of total banking assets in 2007
79.1% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database

Foreign involvement
in banking system

14% of total banking assets in 2007
19% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
Data not available for 2007

Government
ownership of banking
system

1% of banks owned by the state in 2008

Source: Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends
and Implications”

100% insurance on deposits up to $4,000;
90% on next $66,000 in 2007
Existence of deposit
insurance

100% insurance on deposits up to $93,000
after October 2008

Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset,
OECD
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Overview

Background
After the crash of the US subprime mortgage market began, rising defaults on mortgage loans
and falling house prices raised the prospect of investors incurring losses on mortgagebacked securities (MBS). This triggered a general reassessment of the risks inherent in such
securities and increased uncertainty in the value of such securities. This uncertainty spread
from just MBS to all asset-backed securities (ABS) markets. Liquidity in these ABS markets
dried up in the second half of 2007. In such an environment, it became increasingly difficult
for banks to sell securities backed by mortgages or other assets, or to use them as collateral
to borrow cash, making such assets illiquid. As a result, banks were left with an “overhang”
of these assets on their balance sheets (BoE 2008c).
Following the collapse of Bear Stearns Companies in early 2008, it became clear that there
was no immediate prospect that the ABS markets would start to operate as they had
previously. Financial institutions relied heavily on ABS as collateral in the interbank lending
market for funding and liquidity. The Bank of England (BoE) felt that, unless the overhang of
illiquid assets on banks’ balance sheets was dealt with, banks might further curtail their
lending to each other and, more importantly, to the wider economy. The BoE, therefore,
launched the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) on April 21, 2008, to deal with this overhang of
illiquid assets by exchanging them temporarily for more easily tradable assets, which the
banks could use to finance themselves (BoE 2008c).
Program Description
SLS was set up to provide liquidity for temporarily illiquid legacy assets. It aimed to improve
the liquidity position of the banking system and increase confidence in financial markets.
Mervyn King, then governor of the BoE, stated that “Bank of England's Special Liquidity
Scheme is designed to improve the liquidity position of the banking system and raise
confidence in financial markets while ensuring that the risk of losses on the loans they have
made remains with the banks” (BoE 2008b). King also emphasized that the SLS was not a
bailout and was not designed to kick-start the mortgage market. He said that the BoE did not
have an interest in the financial position of the banks, but it was concerned about the ability
of the banks to finance growth in the rest of the economy. The rest of the economy was the
ultimate objective of the SLS (King 2008).
King put the proposal of SLS to the Chancellor of the Exchequer of Her Majesty’s Treasury,
whose approval was required since the SLS involved the issuance of UK Treasury bills to be
swapped with “the less liquid securities of the banking system” (King 2008). SLS allowed
banks to temporarily swap their high-quality assets, including AAA-rated securities backed
by UK and European residential mortgages for UK Treasury bills. The BoE, in its original
announcement of the SLS, stated that it expected use of the SLS to be around £50 billion
based on discussions with banks. The Debt Management Office supplied the BoE with the
necessary Treasury bills, as shown in Figure 1 (BoE 2008b). These Treasury bills were new
issues specifically for the SLS (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012). The BoE also made it clear
that SLS was to be ring-fenced and independent of its regular money market operations (BoE
2008b).
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Figure 1: SLS Collateral Swap

Source: John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012.
Banks could enter into a swap at any point during the six-month drawdown window started
on April 21, 2008 and scheduled to end on October 21, 2008 (BoE 2008b). However, on
September 17, 2008, the BoE extended this window an additional three months to January
30, 2009 (BoE 2008e). SLS eligible institutions were able to access the SLS repeatedly during
this nine-month drawdown window (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012). During the lifetime
of an asset swap, banks were required to pay a fee based on the three-month London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) (BoE 2008b). The fee “was initially fixed on the date of the
drawdown. It was subsequently refixed every three months thereafter based on the LIBORGC spread prevailing at the time” (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
Three key features of the SLS were: (1) the asset swaps would be for long terms, where each
swap was for a period of one year with an option to renew at the BoE’s discretion for a total
of up to three years; (2) the risk of losses on the swapped assets would remain with the
banks; and (3) the swaps would be available only for assets existing at the end of 2007 and
could not be used to finance new lending (BoE 2008b).
Outcomes
As seen in Figure 2, overall use of the SLS increased steadily during the drawdown window
period. Treasury bills worth £75 billion in face value had been borrowed by the time the
original six-month window was extended on September 17, 2008, for three months. Thirtytwo institutions used the SLS, accounting for “over 80% of the sterling balance sheets of the
financial institutions eligible to participate in SLS” (John, Roberts, and Weeeken 2012). By
the time the drawdown window period concluded, on January 30, 2009, these institutions
had swapped for a total of £185 billion in Treasury bills. “This was more than twice the size
of the BoE’s balance sheet prior to the financial crisis” (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
Most of the collateral received in the SLS was MBS and covered bonds backed by UK
residential mortgages. The Bank of England imposed haircuts of 20%–25% on these
securities. In total, the Bank took securities worth £242 billion as collateral in return for £185
billion in Treasury bills, for an average haircut of 22%, as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 2: Face Value of Treasury Bills Borrowed in SLS(a)

Source: John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012.
Figure 3: Collateral Used in the Special Liquidity Scheme as of January 30, 2009

Source: John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012.

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. The purpose of the facility was to provide liquidity to banks and building societies
so that they would be able to support the real economy.
Governor King said the SLS was intended to help banks support the real economy. He denied
that it was intended to “bail out” banks or revitalize the mortgage market directly. “If the
scheme works, then it will have an effect on the mortgage market indirectly, but it was not
designed to intervene directly into the mortgage market” (King 2008).
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The BoE had already tried to use the Sterling Monetary Framework (SMF), its traditional
monetary policy implementation tool, to restore liquidity to the financial sector. The SMF
had capacity to provide a certain amount of liquidity to the financial sector, but the market
demand for liquidity quickly outpaced its capacity. Despite extending SMF operations and
“undertaking a number of extraordinary longer-term open market operations against a
broader range of collateral,” the steep increase in liquidity demand could not be met by SMF.
To satiate this demand, the SLS was created (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
2. Banks were able to enter into new collateral swaps with the BoE only within a
predetermined period, known as the “drawdown window.”
A fixed six-month period from the date of the SLS announcement was set for eligible
institutions to enter into the collateral swap agreements with the BoE. This time period was
called the “drawdown window.” The six-month period was chosen “to be long enough to
allow banks to package up portfolios of legacy loans into a form that would be accepted in
the SLS” (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012). The participants in the SLS were able to access
the SLS repeatedly during the nine-month drawdown window, and no new drawings could
be undertaken once the drawdown window closed (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
The original six-month time period, from April 21, 2008, to October 21, 2008, was extended
by an additional three months. On September 17, 2008, the BoE announced that the program
would remain open until January 30, 2009. The announcement cited “the current disorderly
market conditions” that had resulted from the September 15, 2008, bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
Participants were required to sign the pro forma documentation prepared by the BoE. The
documentation was available on request to those institutions eligible to participate. Once the
legal documentation was signed and following prepositioning of eligible securities with the
BoE, authorized drawdown requests were made to the BoE’s Sterling Markets Desk in order
to conduct a transaction (BoE 2008a).
3. Institutions eligible to participate were banks and building societies, which were
eligible to sign up for the BoE’s Standing Facilities.
Institutions eligible to sign up to the BoE’s existing bilateral Standing Facilities were all
banks and building societies that were required under the Bank of England Act 1998 to place
cash ratio deposits at the BoE (BoE 2008a). Cash ratio deposits are non-interest-bearing
deposits lodged with the BoE by eligible institutions (i.e., banks and building societies) that
have reported average eligible liabilities of more than £600 million over a calculation period
(FAQ).
King explained that the reason for this design was to ensure that the SLS could operate within
the BoE’s normal market operations. Under the SLS, about one-half of building societies in
the UK were eligible; the others did not meet the minimum liability size requirement. King
justified this design feature with two reasons. First, by tradition, the smaller building
societies had been able to access liquidity from larger building societies and banks. Second,
the smaller building societies had not been involved in securitizing mortgages and were not
facing the same potential losses as the larger building societies and banks eligible for SLS
(King 2008).
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4. Transactions in the SLS were initially for a one-year maturity, with the option to
renew up to three years.
In an information document published along with the press release announcing the SLS, the
BoE outlined the timing of the swaps as follows: “To provide banks with the certainty about
liquidity that is needed to boost confidence, assets will, unless they mature within one year,
be swapped for one year and banks will have the opportunity, at the discretion of the Bank
of England, to renew these transactions for a total of up to three years” (BoE 2008c).
The term of the Treasury bills being swapped for the illiquid assets was nine months;
therefore, the Treasury bills had to be exchanged regularly during the life of the swap under
the SLS. To enable such rollovers, participants holding soon-to-mature Treasury bills had to
return these to the BoE once the residual maturities of the bills were between 10 and 20
days. The BoE would then return these old Treasury bills to the Debt Management Office in
exchange for new nine-month Treasury bills, which the BoE would in turn pass back to the
participant on the same day (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
5. Securities eligible to be swapped with the Treasury bills under SLS were highly
rated bonds, asset-backed securities, and debt from loans existing before
December 31, 2007.
SLS was set up to provide liquidity for temporarily illiquid legacy assets (BoE 2008b). The
BoE required each participant to certify compliance with criteria set forth below and
reserved the right to seek independent verification of compliance, at the cost of the
participant. The BoE also reserved the right to reject any security offered for any reason (BoE
2008a).
The eligible securities comprised:
1) UK and European Economic Area (EEA)3 covered bonds rated AAA, including those
issued by the institution, or entities in the same group as the institution, entering into the
transaction. The underlying assets of these covered bonds had to be either mortgages or
public sector debt.
2) AAA-rated tranches of UK and EEA residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
backed by UK and EEA mortgages. The underlying assets were not allowed to be synthetic
(i.e., not derivatives). RMBS backed by mortgages originated by the institution, or entities
in the same group as the institution, entering into the transaction were permitted.
3) AAA-rated tranches of UK, US, and EEA asset-backed securities backed by credit cards,
including those originated by the institution, or entities in the same group as the
institution, entering into the transaction. The underlying assets could not be synthetic
(i.e., not derivatives).
4) Debt issued by Group of 10 (G-10) sovereigns rated Aa3 or higher, excluding securities
eligible in the BoE’s normal open market operations, subject to any settlement
constraints.
5) Debt issued by G-10 government agencies explicitly guaranteed by national
governments, rated AAA; and
_____________________________________________________________________
3

The EEA includes European Union member nations and several non-EU member nations.
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6) Conventional debt issued by the US government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs (Freddie
Mac, Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loans Banks), rated AAA (BoE 2008a).
Additionally, the collateral that was previously eligible in the BoE’s open market operations
(UK and German government debt) was also eligible for SLS (John, Roberts, and Weeken
2012). On October 8, 2008, in support of the government’s actions to recapitalize the UK
banking system, the BoE announced that UK government-guaranteed bank debt would also
be considered eligible securities (BoE 2008f).
Eligible securities were denominated in sterling, euros, US dollars, Australian dollars,
Canadian dollars, Swedish kronor, or Swiss francs, or, in the case of Japanese government
bonds, only yen. Credit ratings were provided by two or more of Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard
and Poor’s (BoE 2008a). However, the ratings requirement was used as a “broad indicator
of standards of credit quality expected, but the BoE exercised its own discretion, avoiding
any mechanical reaction to changes in external ratings” (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
In an answer to concerns about failings of rating agencies revealed during the crisis, King
said that the real weaknesses with the ratings applied less to the standard instruments
eligible for SLS and more to the very complex products like collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) that bundled the riskier tranches of US mortgage-backed securities. He said there
was not much loss in confidence regarding ratings of the standard instruments that were
used by all central banks in their market operations (King 2008).
US MBS—including MBS guaranteed by the GSEs and private-label MBS issued by the private
sector—were not eligible.
Securities eligible for the SLS had to be held on the participant’s balance sheet as of
December 31, 2007. The purpose of the SLS was to “deal with the overhang of existing assets
on banks’ balance sheets, not to finance new lending directly” (John, Roberts, and Weeken
2012).
There was one exception to the December 31, 2007, cutoff rule. Certain securities “were
issued from revolving structures, meaning that the underlying pools of loans backing the
securities accepted as collateral (mostly covered bonds and some RMBS) could be topped up
by loans originated after December 31, 2007” (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012). The BoE
did not disqualify this collateral from the SLS, but rather “decided to limit the value of such
securities that could be delivered into the SLS by a single institution” (John, Roberts, and
Weeken 2012).
Over the three-year life of SLS, the BoE set forth “amortization limits.” For RMBS issued
through a master trust where the pool of assets included mortgages originated after
December 31, 2007, 100% of the level of such securities or underlying loans outstanding on
the balance sheet as of December 31, 2007, were considered eligible in the first year of SLS.
In the second year, two-thirds of those securities were eligible. In the third year, one-third
of those securities were eligible (BoE 2008a; John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
Eligible securities were to be deliverable via: (1) Euroclear or Clearstream, for instruments
issued directly into the International Central Securities Depositories; (2) international links
maintained by Euroclear; or (3) such other delivery mechanism as the BoE specified. Eligible
securities had to be prepositioned with the BoE in advance of a drawdown (BoE 2008a).
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Substitutions of collateral were permitted even after the end of the drawdown period. If the
substitution made after the drawdown period “had a shorter maturity than the underlying
collateral swap, the term of the collateral swap was similarly reduced” (BoE 2008a).
6. Participants in SLS paid fees set forth by the BoE.
In testimony to Parliament a week following the announcement of SLS, then–BoE Governor
King stated that the fee was one of the intentional design principles to protect against moral
hazard (King 2008). Per the Market Notice that accompanied the SLS announcement, “[t]he
fee payable on borrowings of Treasury bills was the spread between 3-month LIBOR and 3month general collateral gilt repo rate, as observed by the BoE, subject to a floor of 20 bps.
The fee also was to vary at the BoE’s discretion” (BoE 2008a).
The fee structure was specifically designed to “reduce over reliance … Higher fees [were
charged] for higher levels of usage relative to the size of each institution’s balance sheet”
(John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
The reason for the use of the general collateral (GC) gilt repo rate was that if SLS participants
wanted to obtain cash, they had to repo the Treasury bills; this would have cost banks
approximately the GC gilt repo rate. Moreover, the floor of 20 bps was higher than the spread
between LIBOR and general collateral gilt repo rate prior to the financial crisis and designed
to make SLS relatively unattractive if market interest rates fell to precrisis levels,
incentivizing the banks to exit SLS. The floor also ensured that the BoE’s administrative costs
were covered, including the fee paid to the Debt Management Office for borrowing the
Treasury bills (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
In order to, “reduce incentives for banks to time their drawings under SLS according to
prevailing market interest rates,” the “spread was fixed on the date of a drawdown and was
refixed thereafter every 3 months” (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012). The fee was based on
the mark-to-market value of the Treasury bills at the closing Debt Management Office
reference prices (BoE 2008a).
The fee was paid every three months at the end of the refix period, or upon termination (BoE
2008a). “Because the fee was payable in arrears, it resulted in the haircut-adjusted market
value of collateral to being greater than the sum of the market value of Treasury bills and the
fee owed to the BoE” (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
Moreover, the BoE charged back to the participants specific legal costs associated with
checking the eligibility of collateral, as discussed below. Custody fees incurred by the BoE in
holding eligible collateral, including where securities had been prepositioned with the BoE,
were charged back to participants (BoE 2008a).
7. Haircuts were applied to eligible securities, and remargining took place daily
based on updated valuations of the eligible securities provided.
In addition to citing fees, King stated that by imposing haircuts on the assets being swapped,
the BoE ensured that the credit risk on these assets stayed with the banks and prevented any
moral hazard concerns (King 2008). Haircuts were also intended to protect the BoE against
loss in the event that a bank participating in SLS defaulted (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
Eligible securities were valued by the BoE using observed market prices that were
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independent and routinely publicly available. The BoE reserved the right to use its own
calculated prices. If an independent market price was unavailable, the BoE used its own
calculated price and applied a higher haircut. The BoE’s valuation was binding (BoE 2008a).
The total haircut applied to an eligible security comprised two elements: (1) a standard base
haircut for that asset type and (2) haircut add-ons to protect against additional risk specific
to that security (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
As shown in Figure 4, the daily mark-to-market value of securities ensured that, “if the value
of the assets pledged fell, after adjusting for haircut, below the value of the Treasury bills
lent, banks either had to provide more assets to the BoE or return some of the Treasury bills
borrowed” (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
Figure 4: Haircuts for Scheme Operations

Source: BoE 2008a, Annex.
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8. The Treasury indemnified the Bank of England against losses.
The Treasury indemnified the Bank of England against any net loss it incurred. The Treasury
would be exposed to loss only if a counterparty defaulted, the value of the collateral provided
by the counterparty fell by more than the size of the haircuts, and the remaining exposure
exceeded any retained SLS fee income (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
9. Early exit from SLS was allowed, and the BoE coordinated with individual banks on
the exit process.
Participating institutions were allowed to “mature, or partially mature” the collateral
pledged at the SLS before their contractual maturity dates, “against surrender of the
Treasury bills” (BoE 2008a).
As shown in the top line of Figure 5 below, “almost all of the £185 billion of Treasury bills
borrowed in the SLS were contractually due to be returned to the BoE in the nine months to
end-January 2012, with almost £70 billion due to be returned in the final month” (John,
Roberts, and Weeken 2012). The BoE wanted a more gradual end to the SLS so there were
not market disruptions with an abrupt end.
Figure 5: Aggregate SLS Repayment Profiles

Source: John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012.
The problem with a significant concentration of maturities in the last few months of the SLS
was that, “the market could have found it difficult to absorb this issuance, which in turn, may
have pushed up the overall funding costs of banks” (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
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Knowing that this would be an issue, the BoE, in late 2009 and early 2010, began discussing
with the major participants how to ensure that the size of the SLS tapered more smoothly as
it approached the January 2012 end date. “Following those discussions, banks were asked to
submit individual voluntary repayment schedules consistent with what they considered to
be credible funding plans” (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012). These plans, in aggregate, can
be seen in the middle line of Figure 5.
As seen in the bottom line of Figure 5, the actual, realized taper was even smoother than the
voluntary plans predicted. One cited reason was “the relatively favourable conditions in
long-term funding markets in the second half of 2010 and first half of 2011” (John, Roberts,
and Weeken 2012).
10. To mitigate stigma, banks’ individual usage of the program was kept confidential,
and the larger banks were persuaded to participate.
Stigma was a key concern for the BoE. For this reason, individual institutions were subject
to strict confidentiality clauses under the terms of the program. The Bank also persuaded the
largest banks to participate so that if there were any accidental disclosures of individual
participation, the market would not take usage of the program as a weakness (Winters
2012).
11. No conditions were attached for shareholders or management.
The BoE did not attach any conditions, such as dividend restrictions on shareholders or
compensation limits on management. This was typical of crisis-era market liquidity
programs; such conditions became common later in the crisis as governments introduced
programs that posed greater risks to taxpayers, such as credit guarantees and capital
injections. In response to a question in Parliament, King said that “this was a central banking
operation which I think would have failed if it had been thought that there were hidden
political agendas attached to it.” He noted that the SLS program was “similar in kind” to the
US Federal Reserve’s Term Securities Lending Facility and Primary Dealer Credit Facility,
announced shortly before the SLS, and that these programs also had attached no nonfinancial
conditions (King 2008).

III. Evaluation
In a 2012 paper outlining the design and operation of the SLS, the Bank of England’s Sterling
Markets Division said, “By providing liquidity support on a one-off basis, in large scale and
for a long maturity, the SLS gave banks time to strengthen their balance sheets and diversify
their funding sources” (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012).
Academic reviews of the SLS’s effectiveness have not been conducted. An early Bank of
England review noted that the Bank “drew on a number of the features of the SLS in designing
a new, permanent bilateral liquidity insurance facility, the Discount Window Facility (DWF)”
(Cross, Fisher, and Weeken 2010).
The SLS was a designed as a temporary facility. In October 2008, the DWF was created as a
permanent collateral swap facility and now makes up one part of four of the Sterling
Monetary Framework. The purpose of the DWF, like the SLS, is to allow firms experiencing
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either a firm-specific or market-wide shock “to borrow highly liquid assets in return for less
liquid collateral” (BoE, n.d). The DWF is different from the SLS in three distinct ways: (1) the
range of collateral accepted by the BoE is greater—for example, portfolios of loans that have
not been packaged into securities are eligible; (2) the fee is increased “when market
conditions are not stressed, so that commercial banks are incentivized to manage their
liquidity risk prudently in the market”; and (3) the swap agreements are intended to be 30
days or less (Cross, Fisher, and Weeken 2010).
A later review of the SLS and other programs, commissioned by the BoE, concluded that the
SLS was “effective and innovative … and accomplished its intended purpose.” However, the
review noted that the BoE had not considered at the outset how banks would exit the
program. As a result, banks “faced material difficulty refinancing their SLS funding and, as a
result, may be reluctant to fully participate in future Bank programmes of a similar nature
for fear that they will find themselves in a difficult position at the point of refinancing”
(Winters 2012). The review noted that the Bank considered this lesson in later initiatives.
The review also noted that smaller banks had difficulty using the program because it
accepted only securitized assets, not raw loans, as collateral. Some banks, particularly
smaller banks, had limited experience with securitization and had mainly raw loans on their
balance sheets at the end of 2007. These banks had to package their loans into securitizations
before they could use the loans as collateral in the SLS, adding costs and time. As a result, the
BoE designed its new Discount Window Facility and repo programs to allow for an expansion
of eligible collateral, including portfolios of raw loans, “without the need for costly
securitization and other structuring processes” (Winters 2012).
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